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Although the European Union has no formal power to conduct spatial planning as such, many of its 
policies have had a clear impact on urban and regional development in its member states. Examples 
include the e ncouragement of certain kinds of development in particular regions via agricultural 
subsidies or the structural funds and discouragement of other developments as a result of Natura2000 
zones or air and water quality standards. This paper will draw on experiences in the Netherlands 
regarding the cumulative effects of EU sectoral policies and make some suggestions on how the 
concept of territorial cohesion, included in the Constitution, may provide a vehicle for reconciling 
potential policy conflicts. 
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I  Introduction 
There is a growing awareness among planners and geographers that the institution of the EU 
is changing the European territory. The change in political boundaries in itself produces 
increased mobility and investment between member states. Even more important however are 
the various agreements made in the EU Treaty and additional legislation (directives), which 
are initiated by the Commission, approved by the Council and Parliament, and finally 
implemented by the member states. In conformance with the subsidiarity principle, directives 
are issued on the ground of a perceived Community wide interest or because they address 
issues which have cross-border effects. These directives have increasingly visible 
consequences for land use; they can be critical for bringing about new forms of development 
or can block new ones from occurring. This fact is particularly relevant for spatial planners 
because this means that despite the fact that the EU has no formal authority for conducting 
spatial policy, it is certainly beginning to feel like it does. Largely drawing upon the ESRA Conference 2005  2  David Evers  
Ruimtelijk Planbureau study Unseen Europe (van Ravesteyn and Evers 2004), this paper will 
reflect on how EU sectoral policy has and is currently affecting spatial developments in the 
Netherlands. It will also identify some of the conflicts that arise in the process, and offer a 
few insights towards a solution. 
 
II  Policies with a spatial impact 
As stated, spatial planning simply does not exist at the EU level. There is no European 
Masterplan or even an EU planning framework besides the unofficial and increasingly 
outdated European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP). No explicit reference is made 
to spatial policy in the current EU Treaty (2001, Nice). The next (Constitution) does however 
mention “territorial cohesion” as a shared responsibility between the EU and the member 
states.
1 How this should be interpreted, and what possibilities it opens up for instigating a 
kind of spatial policy remains a topic of debate however (Faludi 2004). So, given this lack of 
competence in spatial policy, how does the EU manage to affect spatial developments? 
 
The answer lies in the areas for which the EU does have authority to act. These of course 
include activities that deal with the mechanisms of the internal market such as competition, 
fraud and customs, but also public health, employment, justice, education and human rights. 
The most interesting policy areas for planners are those that are generally targeted to certain 
types of areas such as agriculture, environment, transport and regional policy because they 
are more likely to affect spatial developments. The effects are especially visible if the aims 
and/or processes differ from those of the member states. The study  Unseen Europe  for 
example chose to concentrate its analysis on regional, transport, agriculture, competition, 
environment and water policy. This paper will narrow this scope to the impacts of agriculture, 
regional policy, competition and the environment in the Netherlands because each of these 
policy areas highlights a different methodology of application and uncovers some interesting 
policy conflicts when mapped out.
2 
 
                                                 
1 Mere mention of the term “spatial policy” — let alone “spatial planning” — is absolutely taboo in Brussels 
political circles, as it suggests to member states the loss of sovereignty over their territory — even if much of 
this control has already been lost via sectoral policy. 
2 Transport has been omitted due to the fact that the spatial impacts in the Netherlands are very indirect and 
water policy because this will be subsumed under environmental policy.  ESRA Conference 2005  3  David Evers  
Before starting, it is useful to discuss briefly some of the mechanisms at work in the process. 
As we will see, European sectoral policies affect spatial developments, but do so indirectly 
since they are inherently non-spatial and because they generally work via lower tiers of 
government. In understanding how such policies gain spatial relevance, it is useful to keep in 
mind the different kinds of instruments employed by the EU. First, these can take the form of 
subsidies (i.e. carrots) in order to stimulate certain kinds of development or behavior. Since 
EU subsidies are always administered as co-financing, they necessarily entail that the others 
have a stake as well, be it public or private parties. In addition, rather than outright grants EU 
subsidies are subject to a variety of conditions; oftentimes this involves paying heed to 
concepts such as sustainable development and socioeconomic cohesion or engaging in some 
form of transnational cooperation, which in itself is a kind of impact, albeit largely a 
procedural one. Secondly, EU policies can set certain standards that, if violated, can result in 
the imposition of sanctions (i.e. sticks). This is not done directly, as the Commission has no 
inspector-general to monitor compliance, but indirectly — third parties can take legal action 
against those in noncompliance (e.g. competitors in cases of state aid and public procurement 
and environmental organizations or concerned citizens in cases of air and water quality). 
Finally, policies can have effects by introducing new concepts or procedures into the spatial 
planning system of member states, by publishing information on best practices or 
benchmarking reports on worst ones (the “name and shame” method) or via interactive 
approaches such as the open method of coordination (OMC) where peer pressure plays a role. 
Although this wide palette of approaches is in theory open to all EU activities, different 
policy sectors have marked affinities with certain kinds of approaches. As we will see in the 
following Dutch examples, the way this interacts with national policy and the way in which it 
produces an effect on spatial developments is also quite varied. 
 
III  Impacts of sectoral policies: some Dutch examples 
The European policy arena is a continuously evolving environment  — new directives in 
myriad departments are constantly being drafted and implemented, new policy debates are 
emerging and dying out, new political alliances are being forged, amalgamated or disbanded 
and new methods of governance being dreamt up, all of which can, in the end, have a 
physical impact. Acknowledgement of this fact contributed to the perceived necessity of 
attaining a broader view of how, where and how much impact the EU has on planning 
matters. The following examples have been borrowed from the work Unseen Europe, which ESRA Conference 2005  4  David Evers  
is a survey of the impact of EU sectoral policy on spatial developments in the Netherlands 
around 2003, and updated to reflect the present situation.  
 
III a  Agricultural policy 
Certainly in terms of hectares, the most extensive impact on land use in the Netherlands by an 
EU policy is the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); it is also one of the oldest and the most 
expensive of all EU policies. The CAP originated from the idea that Europe should be self-
sufficient in food provision, setting minimum prices for certain agricultural products in order 
to encourage production. Eradication of tariff boundaries within the common market and 
intensification of them outside — some over 200% — allowed a highly regulated market to 
come into being, one which allowed farmers to produce particular goods profitably. This 
manipulation of market forces was highly successful in achieving its goals, but also highly 
costly: CAP absorbed approximately 88% of the entire EEC budget in 1970 (€46 billion). 
Nowadays the cost is similar in absolute terms (€ 43 billion), but much less in relative terms 
(see chart below, taken from EC 2000: 4). Regional policy in particular has since emerged as 
a major ‘carrot’ policy. It should also be noted that, by raising prices paid by consumers, the 
total costs of CAP are much higher; one estimate is €100 billion annually (Rollo 2003: 4).  
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Over the past decades, Dutch farmers — as others — have reaped the benefits of a protected 
agricultural market and many have succeeded in honing their enterprises into modern export-
oriented businesses.
3 From 1950 to 1990 production volumes grew by almost 3.5% annually 
while the number of farms and persons employed in the sector dropped dramatically. 
Currently, the Netherlands is second only to the United States in its level of agricultural 
exports  — no small feat considering its size and population density. The main export 
products are ornamental plants, meat, vegetables and dairy products, and about 90% of all 
greenhouse produce is exported. The imprint of CAP can thus be read in the Dutch landscape. 
In the northern part of the country, grain farmers have consolidated their enterprises to 
achieve better economies of scale and better profits; this has also bestowed on the land a 
rather monotonous appearance. Dairy farms have also profited greatly from CAP support. 
 
Additional evidence for the spatial imprint of CAP in the Netherlands can be found in the 
effects of its reform since the early 1990s. Increasingly, EU agricultural policy has been 
moving away from production support towards rural development (under increasing pressure 
from budget concerns, conflict with other policy sectors and the WTO). One controversial 
measure is to pay farmers not to grow crops on their land: this has had a dual effect: a rise in 
uncultivated agricultural land use, and further intensification of the land remaining in 
production. In the Southwest, pig farmers in Brabant have profited from the reduction of EU 
tariffs on certain grain imports (like soy) in the 1990s, allowing them to step up production 
levels (this intensification has brought them into conflict with EU environmental policy like 
the Nitrates directive). Even before the May 2004 enlargement, the intensity of Dutch 
agriculture — thanks in part to the EU — was already three times the European average. This 
same measure also doomed wheat farmers in the north, who could no longer compete with 
the cheap imported grain since their crops still fell under the price mechanism. So Dutch pigs 
ate grain imported from Asia, while the domestic grain rotted away in silos or was dumped 
on the third world market (Westerman 2003). 
 
The current reforms (e.g. cap on total expenditure, reduction of production support in favour 
of rural development and strongly supported by the current Dutch government) are expected 
to affect different parts of the country in different ways (van Eck et al 2002). Areas producing 
market-protected goods such as starch potatoes, sugar beet, cereals, feed crops, dairy products 
                                                 
3 In a survey of 3,000 farmers in Europe, for example, 75% mentioned the EU as an important stimulus and ESRA Conference 2005  6  David Evers  
and calves and cattle will probably have to further increase efficiency (economies of scale) or 
diversify. However, since only a quarter of the agricultural production value in  the 
Netherlands falls under the price mechanism (as opposed to 59% in the EU as a whole), it 
will be less affected by these changes than other member states. Moreover, the expanded 
markets following the 2004 enlargement offer new opportunities. Still, given the geography 
of the country — high population density and polycentric urban structure coupled with high 
levels of pollution — it is highly probable that much of the rural Netherlands will simply lose 
its agricultural function. Recreation, nature, commercial and residential uses will increasingly 
define these areas as production ceases to be profitable. 
 
On balance, therefore, the CAP can be viewed as an important economic policy employing 
mainly ‘carrot-like’ instruments: direct subsidies for income support to farmers and rural 
development and indirect subsidies via the price mechanism and tariff walls. These subsidies 
have affected spatial developments by altering the rural land market. In addition, by helping 
agricultural production remain profitable, they have also indirectly assisted Dutch planning 
efforts to promote high-density urban development (see van Ravesteyn and Evers 2004: 116-
120). 
 
III b  Regional policy 
Of the various policy areas where the European Union delivers a spatial impact, regional 
policy is the one that is the most explicit in its spatial orientation. After agriculture, it is also 
the most expensive EU policy, consuming approximately one third of the entire EU budget 
via the structural funds and cohesion fund. The main engine of regional policy, the structural 
funds, now in its third term, has a budget of € 213 billion for the 2000-2006 period. The 
primary objective of EU regional policy (Objective 1) is to reduce socioeconomic disparities 
between European regions in order to create a more level playing field in the common 
market. This goal takes up approximately 70% of the current budget. The other two main 
objectives concern economic and social restructuring (Objective 2: 11.5%) and employment 
(Objective 3: 12.3%). In addition, Community Initiatives (5.35% of the budget) are funded 
via the structural  funds which aim to improve cross-border cooperation, cities, rural 
development, gender inequality and the like. By injecting funds into particular regions 
(Objectives 1 and 2 and some Community Initiatives) to help build roads, bridges, office 
                                                                                                                                                        
national governments as the most important barrier and hindrance (van der Ploeg et al 2002: 227). ESRA Conference 2005  7  David Evers  
parks, nature reserves and the like, the EU is essentially conducting spatial policy, even if it is 
emphatically referred to as regional development. 
 
As one would expect, the impacts of structural funds on spatial developments are greatest for 
those countries with the greatest need since the largest ‘carrot’ is given to regions with a GDP 
below 70% of the Community average (ESPON2.2.1 2005). Spain and Ireland, for example, 
have undergone a veritable metamorphosis in their transport infrastructure since the injection 
of massive EU subsidies. Only Flevoland has met the Objective 1 criterion in the 
Netherlands, and has used the subsidies to build new business parks and carry out the A27 
highway expansion fifteen years ahead of schedule as well as to help fund a number of urban 
projects such as a World Trade Center in Almere, a pedestrian walkway network, two railway 
stations and regeneration of the harbor area. Specific activities funded via Objective 2 in the 
Netherlands are too numerous to list here. A few examples include the N391 roadway in 
Drenthe, public transport and Mondo Verde theme park in Limburg, the Gelderse Poort 
nature reserve and multimodal transport terminals in Gelderland, restoration of historical 
monuments in Groningen, the Merenproject for water recreation in Friesland, women 
empowerment center in Amsterdam, and the ubiquitous business parks. Countless other 
projects have been co-financed via the Interreg Community Initiative for border areas and 
transnational cooperation. Whether or not these projects would have been carried out without 
EU support is of course impossible to say for sure, but it should be obvious that even a 
relatively affluent country such as the Netherlands has benefited from EU regional policy, 
primarily designed to help economically weak regions. 
 
With the enlargement, the policy arena for regional policy has changed considerably: the new 
member states are much poorer, making it much more difficult to meet the 70% requirement 
for Objective 1. This, and other concerns, led to a heated debate on how regional policy 
should be reformed. The  Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion  embodies the 
outcome of these negotiations, setting out the policy objectives for the following structural 
funds period (2007-2013). The most significant changes are a redefinition of the core 
Objectives. The first (no longer listed by ordinals however) is Convergence, which signifies 
no substantive change. The second however is Competitiveness and Employment, inspired no 
doubt from the Lisbon strategy, and seems to combine Objectives 2 and 3 in the current 
period. The third new objective is European Territorial Cooperation, which elevates various ESRA Conference 2005  8  David Evers  
Community Initiatives — particularly Interreg — to Objective status (European Commission 
2004).  
 
So what kinds of spatial impacts are these changes likely to bring the Netherlands? The 
answer is probably: less of the same. The heavy infrastructural improvements are generally 
drawn from the Objective 1/Convergence pot, which is definitively out of reach after the 
enlargement. That leaves Competitiveness and Territorial Cooperation, both of which serve 
as proof that no end is in sight to the money-go-round decried by the Dutch government 
during the negotiations leading up to the Third Cohesion Report. Initiatives carried out under 
the banner of Interreg IIIb (North West Europe and Northsea) and the various Interreg IIIa 
cross-border projects may be financed in the future by these structural funds. Here, the 
decision by the province of Brabant to make European cooperation a guiding principle in its 
regional plan, shows foresight. Less happy are the northern provinces that would prefer a 
cohesion-based policy, and are now faced with a national government which has set as its 
priority to increase the status of the most competitive regions in the Netherlands. If the 
national government refuses to co-finance EU programmes in these areas, it would come as a 
double blow. In the end, this would reduce what now in Euro-jargon is called “territorial 
cohesion” in the Netherlands; the rise in economic disparities could provoke increased job-
based migration to the urbanized West.  
 
In conclusion, it cannot be stated for certainty exactly what the land-use impact of European 
regional policy has had in the Netherlands. A host of projects, mainly business parks, have 
been realized using EU funds which has shifted employment intensities in the country. 
Flevoland has shown exceptional job growth, but then again, was never really “deprived” to 
begin with. Priorities have shifted, with EU funding allowing eligible projects to be 
completed ahead of schedule, and European concepts have found their way into various 
spatial plans. New forms of cooperation (cross-border and between provinces) are direct 
results of regional policy, as are the establishment of lobby offices in Brussels. The current 
administration has continually sought to distance itself with EU regional policy, condemning 
the money-go-round aspect at the EU level and adopting a diametrically opposed strategy to 
regional development (targeting already competitive regions). Although regional policy 
seems to have borne the brunt in the political discourse, we have seen that the CAP, 
especially Pillar 1, is the true money-go-round of European policy. 
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III c  Competition policy 
Evening out the economic playing field of Europe may lie at the heart of regional policy in 
theory, but to DG Competition this is core business. As the oldest EU policy, competition 
policy monitors and protects the European internal market, intervening when necessary, 
ensuring that competition is open and fair. Unlike regional policy and agriculture, 
competition policy generally intervenes by establishing clear standards (for products, 
advertisements) to expedite trade between member states, and taking action against 
situations, events or actions that distort free competition. One example is monopoly 
formation. Another is public-sector favoritism, either in the form of state aid, public 
procurement or financing state-owned companies.  
 
The influence of competition policy occurs in an unseen manner via changes to the 
opportunity structure of the actors involved in urban development. Planning rules often work 
by distorting the land market in order to achieve certain social, economic or environmental 
goals (RPB 2005). In this sense, planning itself is suspect. However, the EU has shown no 
inclination to intervene in this market if no discrimination of non-citizens can be proved 
(unlike similar cases in Denmark and Austria); besides it is hard to make the case on the basis 
of subsidiarity. So, although EU competition policy has not so far affected the content of 
planning, it is proving to influence planning procedures, and has even derailed some projects. 
The massive Grensmaas river works project in Limburg, for example, which involved 
enlarging the Meuse river and gravel extraction was delayed and even threatened because it 
had not been properly put to tender, but simply awarded to a Dutch contractor owning land 
along the river (van Ravesteyn and Evers 2004: 80-81). These rules on public procurement 
illustrate that governments are no longer completely free to choose which company they wish 
to do business with. Public authorities are also less free to provide incentives because these 
may be considered as state aid: the Netherlands was forced to pay back subsidies to petrol 
stations on the German border (Klinge-van Rooij 2003: 28) and an investigation into possible 
breach of state aid rules has slowed the development of the AZ stadium in Alkmaar (van 
Houdt 2004: 35). Due to the current decentralization of national planning policy and 
emphasis on developmental planning, these kinds of conflicts could become more common in 
the future.  
 
At present, DG Competition is continuing its struggle to create a more liberalized common 
market. Many of the issues will no longer affect the Netherlands however. Together with the ESRA Conference 2005  10  David Evers  
UK, the Netherlands was a forerunner in the privatization of state companies. Some effects 
are already apparent: three of the four privatized Dutch energy companies have been taken 
over, KLM was taken over by Air France shortly after the government sold off shares, 
individual mobile phone networks were set up following the opening of the telecom market, 
and the privatized railways and housing associations are increasingly acting like profit-driven 
private companies. The Netherlands is also third in Europe (following Luxemburg and the 
UK) in its low levels of state aid (European Commission 2005). At present, state aid in the 
EU remains stable but “there was a shift away from aid to individual companies and towards 
horizontal objectives and in particular R&D and the environment” (European Commission 
2005). Interestingly, the Dutch may have been more fanatic about fighting state aid than 
necessary — R&D public investments have actually fallen since 1999 — given the objectives 
of the Lisbon agenda. Finally, a pet project of DG Competition has been to introduce more 
transparency into the fiscal systems in Europe. This was given a boost by the midterm 
evaluation of the Lisbon agenda: “the harmonization of the corporate tax base throughout the 
Union would significantly cut the administrative burden on companies operating in several 
member states and should be agreed without delay” (Kok 2004: 27). The Netherlands 
currently profiles itself as a business-friendly tax environment — and has been criticized, 
together with Ireland, for this — and could be potentially disadvantaged by actions taken at 
the European level to level out the playing field in this way. 
 
In conclusion, European competition policy affects spatial developments rather indirectly. 
Rules on state aid and public procurement constrict the options available for especially local 
governments to engage in developmental-oriented planning. Harmonization of tax laws may 
have a similar e ffect in the future. The liberalization and privatization promoted by the 
European Union has also resulted in having less control over developments in the territory. It 
should be obvious that competition policy relies exclusively on ‘sticks’ to effectuate change: 
fines can be imposed or projects blocked. There are no subsidies issued to encourage better 
competitive practices, for example. 
 
III d  Environmental policy 
Currently, the spatially relevant policy area that is drawing the most attention in the 
Netherlands is EU environmental policy. It is also one which clearly illustrates the mismatch 
between a sectoral and a territorial approach. The justification for conducting environmental ESRA Conference 2005  11  David Evers  
policy at the European level lies in the principle of the common market, namely that 
companies should compete in a similar regulatory environment, and the fact that 
environmental problems disregard national borders — polluted water flows downstream into 
other member states, polluted air and acid rain follows the wind and climate change and 
biodiversity is even a global matter. In order to overcome a ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
situation it is best to resolve such issues at a high level of scale with clear standards. 
 
The impact of environmental policy is only now beginning to become fully appreciated in the 
Netherlands. The designation of the Natura2000 ecological network on the basis of the Birds 
Directive of 1979 and the Habitats Directive of 1992 places an effective block on urban 
development in these areas. Recent experience has shown that the EU is rather rigid in its 
enforcement, and this nearly thwarted efforts to expand the Rotterdam harbor (Maasvlakte 2). 
In this case, the Dutch had to agree to implement a range of compensatory measures, which 
will be monitored by the European Commission. Countless other projects have run into 
problems, largely because building permits had been issued prior to designation of 
Natura2000 in the planning system and had caught planners, municipalities and developers 
off-guard. On the other hand, environmental concepts, particularly sustainable development, 
have found their way into planning practices and plans, partly due to the criteria for obtaining 
structural funds. 
 
It is safe to say that EU environmental policy will become increasingly important in the 
Netherlands. Not because the country is becoming more polluted — it is not — but because 
the deadlines for realizing the agreed targets are approaching. A glimpse at what is to come 
arrived at the beginning of 2005 when the Dutch were required  to comply with the 
particulates requirement (fine particles and dust) stemming from the Air Quality Framework 
Directive. This has already created panic in the Netherlands because various projects 
(infrastructure, urban development) cannot move ahead since they are to be realized in areas 
that do not comply with the air quality standards. The newspaper  Trouw identified over 
twenty such projects around the Randstad where the problem is greatest (in Bouwman and 
Visser 2005). Ironically, the “solution” to this problem of air quality is to abandon hopes of 
dense urban development and opt for a more sprawl-oriented pattern; this of course flies in 
the face with notions of sustainable development espoused by DG Environment and others, 
but does offer temporary development opportunities. In 2010 a similar panic will surely erupt 
as the deadline for meeting maximum nitrogen oxide levels in the air arrives and the ESRA Conference 2005  12  David Evers  
particulates standard is tightened (which is currently exceeded throughout almost the entire 
country). In terms of space, the most far-reaching of EU environmental policies may be the 
Water Framework Directive (WFD), which sets targets for water quantity and quality 
beginning in 2015. It is already virtually certain that these targets will be impossible to meet. 
This is because the Netherlands has an exceptionally high levels of phosphorus and nitrate in 
the soil, compounded by agriculture (especially intensive livestock farming), which seeps 
into the groundwater. According to one estimate, complying with the WFD would entail the 
loss of over half of all land-based agricultural production in the country. Although air quality 
has currently captured most media attention, the WFD has the potential to be much more 
significant in terms of its spatial (and economic) impacts. 
 
In sum, environmental policy is having an increasing impact on land-use in the Netherlands 
by setting standards that demand spatial responses (rerouting of traffic, transforming 
agricultural land into nature) and by prohibiting the development in certain areas (residences 
due to excessive air pollution or Natura2000). Like competition, environmental policy also 
uses ‘sticks’ rather ‘carrots’ to effectuate compliance, although some of its methods like 
‘name and shame’, are more politically than legally motivated. 
 
IV  Reflection on impacts 
This paper examined the various ways that sectoral policy drafted at the EU level can affect 
spatial developments, using the Netherlands as an example. It should be noted that in some 
respects the Netherlands is a unique case in Europe: it is the largest net-payer to Europe, it 
has the highest population density, and greatest concentration of pollution. In this sense, it is 
not necessarily representative. Still, some of the findings here correspond to those found in 
other territorial impact studies of sectoral policy carried out by ESPON and others (Robert et 
al 2001). In addition, many of the general conclusions regarding mismatch of policies due to 
the lack of spatial imbedding will be valid in any case. 
 
The location of the sector policy impacts have been summarized in two maps below, one 
relating to the investments made (carrots) and the other to the regulations (sticks). Problems 
with non-spatial nature of sectoral policies can be seen by strange overlaps of areas on the 
two maps. This lack of geographical sensitivity heightens the probability of policy conflict. ESRA Conference 2005  13  David Evers  
Regional policy areas (whose goal, stimulation of employment, is often achieved via 
infrastructure and commercial land development) 
 
 
From these two maps, one can read that regional development areas overlap with Natura2000 
zones. Similarly, agricultural subsidies are being received in the same areas where ground 
water quality should necessitate the removal of the productive function. At the same time, 
rules on public procurement have thwarted projects that would benefit regional development 
in an EU border region and state aid makes it difficult to initiate public-private partnerships 
for dense urban development, as advocated by the EU. Worse, this kind of development, 
particularly in the Netherlands, can clash with rigid environmental directives on air quality.  
 
Some of these policy conflicts could have been avoided if more attention had been paid to the 
territorial aspect of these sectoral policies. This had already been identified by Robert et al 
(2001) and steps taken towards a solution in the European Spatial Development Perspective 
(Committee on Spatial Development 1999). Increasing evidence from ESPON — especially 
regarding agriculture — seems to confirm the long-held suspicion that ignoring the territorial 
dimension can lead to unwanted and contradictory results. The inclusion of the term 
“territorial cohesion” in addition to social and economic cohesion as a shared responsibility 
of the European Union in the Constitution seems, in part at least, an answer to this rallying 
cry by planners and geographers. The results of the referenda in the Netherlands and France 
notwithstanding, it seems likely that the next EU Treaty will still include this term. The ESRA Conference 2005  14  David Evers  
question, then, is what to do next. Regarding this, the Dutch and Luxemburg presidencies 
have both embraced the term, and have advocated the continuation of the ESPON 
programme, which signals important steps towards a more spatial orientation. The upcoming 
British presidency plans to work on a document called “The Territorial State and Perspective 
of the European Union” to be published under the German presidency in 2007. Thus, the EU 
seems to be slowly but surely moving ahead on this issue. 
 
In the meantime, hopefully, this geographical, spatial or territorial dimension will find its way 
into the thinking of the various sectoral departments. The question of whether or not the EU 
can ever or should ever engage in spatial policy may be rendered irrelevant if the sectors, 
particularly clearly spatially relevant ones like DG Regio and DG Environment, take up the 
task. This would require in some cases a change in mentality (adjusting standards to match 
geographic attributes), but would be an important step forward in the effectiveness of 
European policy. 
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